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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effects of legal uncertainty around corporate 
income taxation on foreign direct investment (FDI). Legal uncertainty can 
take many forms: double tax agreements, different types of legal systems 
and corruption. We test the effect of legal uncertainty on foreign direct 
investment with an international panel. We find that an increase in the 
ratio of the statutory corporate income tax rate of the destination relative 
to the source country exhibits a negative impact on foreign direct 
investment. Interacting the statutory corporate income tax rate with 
measures of legal uncertainty, we observe a negative effect. 
 
1. Motivation and related Literature 
 
1.1. Foreign direct investments and their determinants 
Foreign direct investment (henceforth FDI) has become an important 
source of private external finance for developed and especially for 
developing countries. Essentially, there are three motives for FDI. First, 
there is FDI related to the availability of location-bound resources or 
assets (“resource/asset-seeking” i.e. raw materials; low-cost unskilled 
labor; skilled labor; technological, innovative; physical infrastructure). 
Second, there are FDI related to the size of markets for goods and 
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services (“market-seeking” i.e. market size and per capita income; market 
growth; access to regional and global markets; country-specific consumer 
preferences; structure of markets). Third, there are FDI related to cost 
advantages in production (“efficiency seeking” i.e. cost of resources and 
assets listed above adjusted for labor productivity; other input costs, 
such as transport and communication costs to/from and within host 
economy and other intermediate products; membership of a regional 
integration agreement conducive to the establishment of regional 
corporate networks). 
The increasing globalization and liberalization of the world economy has 
forced firms to seek new markets, new resources and new assets. Within 
this new economic environment the traditional motives related to FDI 
development above mentioned (market-seeking, resource-seeking, and 
efficiency-seeking) have not disappeared, however they are being 
incorporated into firms' broader competitive-enhancing strategies. 
Nowadays transnational corporations looking to invest take for granted 
the presence of state-of-the-art FDI frameworks and a range of business 
facilitation measures, and increasingly seek a combination of cost 
reduction, larger markets, and “created" assets that can help them to 
maintain a competitive edge (communications infrastructure, marketing 
networks, technology, and innovative capacity i.e. critical for enabling 
firms to maintain their competitiveness in a rapidly changing world).  
While FDI represents investment in production facilities, its significance 
for developing countries is much greater than for developed countries. 
Different groups of developing countries have contributed with a different 
degree to the spread of FDI. Not only can FDI add to investment and 
capital formation, but, perhaps more important, it is also a means of 
transferring production technology, skills, innovative capacity, and 
organizational and managerial practices between locations, as well as of 
accessing international marketing networks. The first to benefit are 
enterprises that are part of transnational systems (consisting of parent 
firms and affiliates) or that are directly linked to such systems through 
nonequity arrangements. But these assets can also be transferred to 
domestic firms and the wider economies of host countries if the 
environment is conducive. The greater the supply and distribution links 
between foreign affiliates and domestic firms, and the stronger the 
capabilities of domestic firms to capture spillovers (that is, indirect 
effects) from the presence of and competition from foreign firms, the more 
likely it is that the attributes of FDI that enhance productivity and 
competitiveness will spread. In these respects, beyond inducing 
transnational corporations to locate their activities in a particular 
country, policies and fiscal strategies matter.  
Globalization has lead to an increase in the level of FDI directed to 
developing countries. In this context the above mentioned changes of 
firms’ strategies is no longer the only determinant of the relative change 
in the importance of the traditional motives that impact FDI. Nowadays 
the main concern for firms to invest in developing countries is the 
assurance to find a good environment for FDI in terms of: political and 
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social stability and the presence of rules and laws that assure legal 
certainty in carry on the business. 
More specifically we can distinguish five basic principles, which can be 
considered fundamental components of a macro-legal environment for 
FDI in developing countries. The first is the publicity of the rule of law, 
which enables all concerned parties to have access to the laws they have 
to abide. The second is the clarity and certainty of the legal framework, 
which allows such parties to understand which laws are applicable to 
their situation and what their specific meaning is. The third is 
predictability in the application of the rule of law, which reduces the 
risks linked to changing interpretation, implementation or enforcement of 
the laws. The fourth is stability of the legal, political and policy 
frameworks, which provides investors assurances that the local 
government will not unilaterally and unfavorably change the basic 
conditions underlying their investment decisions. Finally, there is 
fairness, in particular the possibility of legal recourse and due process, 
with access to independent judiciary and dispute settlement mechanism. 
 
1.2. Legal uncertainty 
An analysis of the effect of corporate income taxation on FDI can not be 
done without considering the overall impact that legal uncertainty has on 
this relationship. In order to reach a beneficial environment for FDI, 
harmonization (same legal systems) and clarity of law inside these 
countries is a prerequisite. The need for this harmonization derives in 
part from the costs of legal diversity and the legal uncertainty that 
possibly results from it for particular groups. Broadly, “legal certainty” 
would imply dynamic and efficient substantive laws clearly stating the 
rights, obligations, and liabilities of all business parties, rule-based 
business transactions, procedural law providing prompt and inexpensive 
means to the courts, an institutional framework that supports business 
development and sustainability, strict adherence to the principles of ‘rule 
of law’ and ‘supremacy of the law’, and an efficient and independent 
judiciary. Legal uncertainty on the other hands always occurs when 
individual actors are uncertain of the effects of the provisions of the 
dominant legal system on the results of their actions.  
The term “legal uncertainty” covers both “subjective” and “objective” 
aspects. The term “subjective legal uncertainty” refers here to the 
subjective assessment of marginal costs and marginal utility, which 
differs from individual to individual. Subjective legal uncertainty can also 
be referred to as “uncertainty as to what the law is”. In case of complete 
legal uncertainty it is irrational to want to improve an individual 
knowledge of the law due to the considerable information and transaction 
costs. In fact with increasing marginal costs of acquiring information and 
the diminishing marginal utility of additional legal knowledge, individual 
economic subjects will only spend on information and transactions until 
marginal costs and marginal utility are equal. In this context ignorance 
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beyond this will remain in existence and then that decisions will continue 
to be taken under uncertainty. 
The term “objective legal uncertainty” describes an objective legal reality 
that has to be accepted to an equal extent by all parties involved. It 
occurs where statutory regulations for certain sets of facts are either 
non-existent or do not form a reliable and sure basis for decisions. There 
are three areas of “objective legal uncertainty”. First, absence of law 
applies to areas for which there are (as yet) no statutory rules and 
regulations, i.e. areas not subject to national sovereignty, such as the 
seabed, space, the environment and legal areas which have not yet been 
determined, such as in some transformation and developing countries. 
Second, legal instability occurs where regulations are unstable over and 
beyond consumption or investment periods, because amendments to 
statutes are frequent and unforeseeable, so that even experts are not 
clear about the current legal position and the continuance of subjective 
claims. Third, denial of justice is understood to be the obstruction or 
prevention of the enforcement of legal rights by state authorities or 
employees. In the following we will assume a very broad meaning for legal 
uncertainty, one which includes all the aspects here referred to.  
There is a debate whether “legal certainty” decreases over time. The 
supporters of this view claim that this is a legal specific and natural 
event mainly due to the fact that rules and principles of law become more 
and more uncertain in content and in application as legal systems are 
biased in favor of explaining those rules and principles. The increasing 
uncertainty of the “rule” means that the rule becomes vague, 
inapplicable, ambiguous and remote. This can be manifested in two 
ways. First, rules may become more uncertain “on the books” namely the 
court’s decision becomes a part of the meaning of the rule, so that the 
rule becomes more complex as it is become both a statute and a judicial 
decision. The second way rules may become more uncertain is in their 
application. The above described is however an intrinsic aspects of any 
legal systems that can also indirectly impact the degree of uncertainty in 
transnational investments.  
Legal uncertainty in a very broad meaning generates transaction costs 
which obviously are higher in international transactions than in domestic 
trade. The costs of collecting information due to the lack of knowledge of 
foreign statutes prevent international purchases or leads to the necessity 
of more expensive information collection. There are costs of legal 
disputes, which are much greater in the event of international legal 
disputes than in the case of a domestic legal dispute (Freyhold, Gessner, 
Vial and Wagner, 1995). There are costs of setting incentives for pushing 
through legal claims. This includes private attempts to speed up approval 
procedures and legal procedures. As is known, “beneficial charges”, that 
apply in particular in developing countries, and include bribes or pay-
offs, represent an important cost factor for multinational corporations. 
Part of this is probably the result of having to deal with legal uncertainty 
or legal instability and, sometimes also corruption issues (Wei, 1997). 
Finally, there are other transaction costs, in particular due the 
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difficulties involved in complaining about goods, in making warranty 
claims and in exchanging goods. The associated costs in case of 
international transactions, including travel expenses, time spent 
(opportunity costs), and annoyance (negative utility), are high, in 
particular if law suits are the consequence. 
 
1.4. The role of legal systems  
The legal system is one of the most important institutions of a society. 
Among the various definitions of institution we will refer to the following 
one: “institutions” are formal and informal mechanisms, which control 
social interaction in some form or other and in this way shape 
restrictions for individual behaviour so that negotiation and coordination 
costs are reduced (North, 1994). 
Legal uncertainty due to different legal systems in act can represent an 
investment risk for both domestic and foreign investors. For domestic 
investors it is not only the actual existence of institutions as being 
important but also their stability. For foreign investors the legal 
uncertainty can be caused not only by imperfect national legal systems, 
but also by the different natures of legal systems in the international 
context. 
Moreover as far as transnational economic integration and FDI are 
concerned, law is a fundamental instrument. There are high costs 
involved in cross-border business due to different legal systems within a 
global or a regional area. These costs are, on the one hand, occurring 
through the collection of information about the respective national 
regulations, and, on the other hand, are due to the uncertainty of 
individual cross-border transactions that increase the number of legal 
provisions and processes that could be faced. 
More in details different legal systems may imply: 
- Additional costs for acquiring the information needed to write a 
particular contract in other legal areas. 
- Higher costs for litigating issues under various contracts governed by 
different legal regimes. 
- Costs of instability due to the fact that several contracts are subject to 
subsequent changes in the law. 
- Diversity in judicial administration across the different countries. 
These high costs are the main reason why there are strong forces that 
push for harmonization of law within the European Union and beyond. 
The sustainers of this harmonization assume that legal diversity causes 
transaction costs and lowers economic trade and welfare, in particular by 
creating legal uncertainty. It is argued that legal diversity increases the 
transaction costs of cross-border contracting and discourages consumers 
and small entrepreneurs from engaging in such transactions. Consumers 
as well as producers tend to refrain from contracts in foreign legal 
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systems (thus having a negative impact on the level of FDI) if the costs of 
information (about the law, about administrative procedures, about 
competent legal advice) and/or the costs of enforcement (by way of 
litigation or alternative forms of dispute resolution) seem too high or 
unpredictable. This unpredictability or uncertainty about the costs of 
cross-border transactions may arise from the diversity in the formal legal 
system or diversity in judicial administration across the individual 
member countries. 
In general empirical research on the effect of legal uncertainty on 
economic trade and growth suffers from the difficulty of measuring 
correctly the degree of legal uncertainty. Most studies model legal 
uncertainty using factors such as political instability, juridical 
incredibility, a lack of civil liberty or the degree of corruption. All these 
studies concentrate on explaining cross-country variations in growth due 
to differences in legal uncertainty within a country in worldwide samples 
or only for developing economies. 
Written law is the first observable characteristics of formal institutions 
used in empirical research in order to measure the quality of legal 
institutions. For example, it has been discovered that formal legal 
protections for investors correlate with the size and depth of capital 
markets and hence with investment levels (La Porta et al., 1999). This 
approach has some limitations due to the fact that cannot capture the 
role of informal institutions and cannot take into account possible 
interdependencies with formal institutions. 
Another approach uses proxy variables that measure the quality of 
institutions indirectly (Barro, 1991). The quality of this approach clearly 
depends on the quality of the proxy chosen.  
Surveys of country risk experts or foreign and domestic investors are 
normally used as a third approach in the empirical literature on the 
impact of legal uncertainty or institutions on economic growth. These 
surveys cover a series of questions about the business environment. 
However, also this third approach is subject to criticism. Some authors 
note that the survey data used in this approach raises at least two 
relevant difficulties (Rodrik, 2004). First the survey data is highly 
subjective and may depend upon other aspects than the actual 
institutional environment. Second this kind of data gives no policy 
guidelines because the results say nothing about which institutional 
model is superior but just that it is important to make investors feel save. 
There are recent studies that explicitly analyze the effects of cross-border 
legal uncertainty taking into consideration mainly two variables (Turrini 
and van Ypersele, 2006). The first variable is an index of legal similarity; 
the other is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a pair of countries shares the 
same origin of their legal system and to 0 otherwise. The estimation of a 
standard gravity equation augmented by one of these two variables show 
that trade flows are higher by about 65 per cent if a pair of countries has 
identical legal procedures or, respectively, by 47 per cent if a pair of 
countries shares common origins for their legal systems. These results 
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are in line with other results (den Butter and Mosch, 2003) that find for a 
sample of 25 OECD countries that a pair of countries with a similar legal 
system trades about 46 to 84 percent more with each other than 
countries with a different legal system. Hence on average from these 
studies it seems that a country pair with a similar legal system trades 
almost 50 percent more with each other. Other studies use firm-level 
data (del Gatto et al., 2006) to simulate that a 5 per cent reduction in 
international trade barriers (induced by legal harmonization) results in a 
2.13% increase in productivity due to a more competitive environment.  
Another study considers from a theoretical point of view the issue 
whether legal harmonization could be an appropriate solution to the 
problem of the high macroeconomic costs of legal uncertainty (Wagner, 
2009). In this paper legal uncertainty is regarded as a non-tariff trade 
barrier. However the author does not suggest that full harmonization is 
necessary, because also harmonization itself generates substantial costs. 
These costs include: direct costs for developing new bureaucracies or 
demolishing old structures; costs arising from a loss of the advantages of 
system competition (the advantages being an adaptation to the variety of 
preferences, efficiency advantages of regulative competition, and the 
minimization of “rent-seeking” costs caused by bureaucrats/politicians). 
However in the paper it is also claimed that, from the point of view of the 
economy as a whole, welfare gains could be realized through more 
harmonization. 
In the light of the above considerations the paper suggests to adopt a 
step-by-step approach that would also allow the correction of errors at an 
early stage. At first is suggested to start with harmonization of contract 
law for international (transborder) transactions that would give 
individuals time to get acquainted with the new regime and to evaluate it. 
The background of the experience gathered through this first stage 
should make it possible to turn to a more comprehensive harmonization 
at a later stage if this then is assessed as being desirable. However the 
author also warns that a legal harmonization only makes sense if it is 
accompanied by a thorough reform of the system of civil justice and a 
harmonization of procedural law. The paper concludes that: “a full 
harmonization (at first sight) may seem to be an adequate instrument for 
reducing the costs of cross-border legal uncertainty; however, full 
harmonization itself tends to imply high economic costs, so that it is not 
generally recommendable. Nevertheless, a gradual (partial) 
harmonization process could, in some circumstances, be beneficial” 
(Wagner, 2009).  
 
1.4. Tax treaties and double tax agreements  
Economists have long been concerned about the effect of taxation on 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Many studies have examined whether 
and to what extent FDI responds to tax incentives, finding that actually 
firms do indeed respond to a variety of tax policies and that this can 
result in an inefficient allocation of investment across countries. As 
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governments use their tax policies to affect the rates of return on capital, 
provide public goods, or simply capture part of the profits that would 
otherwise be repatriated to other countries, this can allocate investment 
away from its most productive use.  
One potential method of eliminating this inefficiency is a bilateral tax 
treaty on FDI. These treaties adjust the tax environment for investment 
between treaty partners by specifying the applicable tax base, the 
withholding taxes that can be applied, and other measures affecting the 
taxation of FDI. Worldwide, over 2,000 of these treaties are in force and 
they govern the taxation of the large majority of FDI (Radaelli, 1997). Tax 
treaties should also provide certainty and protection regarding the level 
of taxation on investments abroad which may, for instance, be valued by 
business when deciding on the location of a regional headquarters.  
Double tax agreements (or double tax treaties, henceforth DTT) are made 
in order to avoid double taxation and prevent fiscal evasion with respect 
to taxes on income. But their wider function is to try to facilitate 
investment, trade, movement of technology, and movement of personnel 
between countries. The double tax agreements reduce or eliminate 
double taxation caused by the overlapping taxing jurisdictions because 
treaty partners agree to limit taxing rights over various types of income. 
These tax agreements also agree on methods of reducing double taxation 
where both countries have a right to tax and moreover generally include 
an exchange of information facility in order to prevent fiscal evasion. The 
two tax administrations can also use the mutual agreement procedures 
to develop a common interpretation and resolve differences of application 
of the tax treaty.  
Double taxation occurs if a multinational company (henceforth MNC) 
pays tax on the same corporate income earned from economic activity in 
a foreign country twice: once to the tax authorities of the foreign country, 
which is host to the economic activity, and once to the tax authorities of 
the home country, in which the company is domiciled.  
Double taxation has to be avoided, through double tax agreements, as it 
could represent an obstacle or barrier to foreign investment, thus 
distorting the efficient allocation of scarce financial resources across 
countries of the world. Yet, DTTs can also reduce FDI in as much as they 
reduce tax avoidance, tax evasion and other more or less legal tax-saving 
strategies such as transfer pricing by multinational companies (Blonigen 
and Davies, 2002). The 2003 Revision to the Commentary to the treaty 
model of the OECD explicitly mentions prevention of tax avoidance as an 
objective of DTTs (Arnold, 2004).  
More in detail, the theory claims that tax treaties play four major roles, 
two of which are likely to increase FDI and two of which tend to reduce it 
(Blonigen and Davies, 2004). Tax agreements increase FDI as they 
standardize tax definitions and jurisdictions. Janeba (1996) theoretically 
shows that such coordination can reduce the double taxation of affiliate 
income. Tax treaties affect the taxation of multinational enterprises by 
lowering withholding taxes and increasing tax certainty. In particular, 
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Edmiston, Mudd, and Valev (2003) find that uncertainty over tax policy is 
a significant barrier to FDI. Thus, if a tax treaty reduces the likelihood of 
a host nation unilaterally changing its tax policy, this added certainty 
would increase FDI.  
The combination of these two roles of treaties increases the expected 
value of after-tax returns from FDI leading one to expect that the 
introduction of a tax treaty should increase FDI. These above mentioned 
FDI-increasing aspects of treaties are however at least partially offset by 
the following two FDI-reducing roles of treaties, due to the increased 
enforcement of transfer pricing regulation. This occurs by the 
introduction of additional regulations on the calculation of internal 
prices, establishing guidelines for resolving disputes between taxation 
authorities, and encouraging the exchange of information between 
authorities. The establishment of anti-treaty shopping provisions inhibits 
the ability to direct profits through low-tax treaty partners in order to 
minimize tax payments. Since these increase the taxation of affiliate 
income in a given host, they would lead one to anticipate that a tax treaty 
might reduce FDI. 
Despite the large and increasing number of DTTs concluded, there exists 
little evidence on the question whether they increase FDI or not. This is 
surprising given that the question is of great importance especially to 
developing countries that invest time and other scarce resources to 
negotiate, conclude, sign and ratify a lot of DTTs. If no increase in FDI 
can be expected, then the effort spent concluding DTTs would be wasted 
and the costs imposed would fail to be recovered. In their aim to increase 
FDI inflows, developing countries have resorted to bilateral treaties to 
signal their commitment to stable, correct practices and offer favorable 
treatment to foreign investors. By signing DTTs, developing countries 
provide foreign investors with security and stability as regards the issue 
of taxation in addition to the relief from double taxation. By signing 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs), developing countries commit to 
granting certain relative standards such as national treatment (foreign 
investors may not be treated any worse than national investors, but may 
be treated better and, in fact, often are) and most-favored nation 
treatment (privileges granted to one foreign investor must be granted to 
all foreign investors). They also agree to guarantee certain absolute 
standards of treatment such as fair and equitable treatment for foreign 
investors in accordance with international standards after the investment 
has taken place. BITs typically ban discriminatory treatment against 
foreign investors and include guarantees of compensation for 
expropriated property or funds, and free transfer and repatriation of 
capital and profits. Further, the BIT parties agree to submit to binding 
dispute settlement should a dispute concerning these provisions arise 
(UNCTAD, 1998). 
There are two model treaties for DTTs available, which are regularly 
updated and on which treaty partners can base their treaty if they wish 
to do so: one from the OECD, the other one from the United Nations. The 
OECD model treaty clearly favors residence taxation, which benefits 
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developed countries since it is mainly developed country investors who 
invest in developing countries, not the other way around and residence 
taxation favors countries with net positive foreign asset positions. The UN 
model treaty, on the other hand, provides more room for source-based 
taxation, which is more beneficial to developing countries for the same 
reason. Critics argue, however, that the UN model treaty is not 
sufficiently different from the OECD model treaty and is still biased 
against developing country interests (Figueroa, 1992). Also, the vast 
majority of DTTs are based on the OECD model (Arnold, Sasseville and 
Zolt, 2002). 
The rising importance of FDI in the world economy has increased the 
attention of researchers into policies that governments use to influence 
multinational enterprises. Among these policies certainly taxation is one 
of the most interesting and recent objects of great attention. 
There is a growing literature on the effects of tax treaties on FDI. Theory 
general claims that, in line with the OECD’s (1997) model treaty, treaties 
are intended to increase FDI. However the empirical literature generally 
finds no evidence for the theoretical hypothesis: researchers find in 
general an insignificant or a weakly negative effect of treaty formation on 
FDI (Louie and Rousslang, 2007; Millimet and Kumas, 2007). This result 
is often interpreted suggesting that the FDI increasing aspects of treaties, 
such as tax certainty or withholding tax reductions are balanced with 
negative effects as mentioned above, yielding a zero net effect of treaties 
on multinational enterprises.  
Blonigen and Davies (2002) represent the first attempts to estimate the 
impact of tax treaties on FDI. Respectively using panel data on OECD 
FDI (where FDI is measured as stocks) and US FDI (where FDI is 
measured as stocks or sales), these papers find that after controlling for 
country fixed effects there is either a small negative or insignificant effect 
of treaty formation on FDI. In details using OECD data they find that new 
treaty activity (during the 1983-1992 period) suggests strong negative 
impacts on FDI. While they find a positive correlation in the case of much 
older treaties, they cannot weight this evidence very heavily as they 
cannot observe FDI activity before these treaties were in place. These 
results are consistent with previous work by Blonigen and Davies (2002) 
using only US data. Thus, in conjunction with this earlier work, the 
results cast doubt upon the FDI promotion rationale for treaty formation, 
which stands in contrast to the conventional wisdom among many 
economists and lawyers. The authors suggest that one possible reason 
for the non-promotion effect of treaties on FDI activity is that treaties 
reduce firms’ abilities to evade taxes through transfer pricing or treaty 
shopping. An additional possibility for non-promotion of FDI activity by 
new treaties is that treaties may increase investment uncertainty, at least 
in the short run. Since a new treaty has yet to be tested in the courts of 
the partner countries, it may actually increase the perceived risk of 
investment between treaty partners until the legal interpretation of the 
treaty has been resolved. Thus, in the short run, the treaty may lead to a 
reduction in FDI activity. Over the long run, however, this uncertainty 
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will be resolved, clearing the way for the treaty to promote investment. 
However, when the authors include the new treaty dummy variable with 
a lag of one year (or even two years) after the treaty was enacted; they get 
similar negative and statistically significant effects of new treaties on FDI 
activity. This would argue that the uncertainty issue is not behind the 
effects they find unless it takes many years to resolve such uncertainty.  
Egger, Larch, Pfaffermayr, and Winner (2006), who control for the 
endogenous selection of which treaties are actually formed, find that 
treaties significantly reduce FDI stocks. Davies, Norbäck and Tekin-Koru 
(2007) expand the research on this by utilizing affiliate-level data from 
Swedish-owned multinationals from 1965 to 1998. In line with earlier 
studies, they find no significant effect from treaty formation on the level 
of affiliate sales.  
An important study from Neumayer (2006) finds, against all the results 
so far mentioned, robust empirical evidence that DDTs increase FDI to 
developing countries. However when the author splits developing 
countries into low-income and middle-income countries, he found that 
DDTs are effective in the group of middle income countries.  
 
1.5. Corruption 
Corruption has always been considered an important determinant of 
foreign direct investment. Corruption can take manifold forms. One 
possible street for corruption works through the legal system. Corrupt 
officials and judges may decide against the law or at least postpone the 
judicial process, which has a cost to foreign investors. As the degree of 
potential corruption in the legal system is unknown, corruption may 
cause legal uncertainty. For this reason, we will consider apart from 
differences in legal systems and double tax agreements also the role of 
corruption as an explanatory variable for corruption.  
The direction of the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment is 
unclear in the literature (Al-Sadig, 2009). The reason may be that foreign 
investors may use corruption to facilitate their investment, thus 
circumventing bad institutions. This argument has been recently made 
by Delios et al (2005). Cross section regressions typically support the 
view that corruption is bad for FDI, but this may be due to an omitted 
variable bias, as countries that attract little FDI for different reasons may 
also be the most corrupt. When controlling for country fixed effects in a 
panel, Al- Sadig (2009) finds that corruption has no impact at all on FDI. 
Caetano and Caleiro (2005) split the countries in two samples, high 
corruption and low corruption countries, and find that the effect of 
corruption on FDI is negative only for high corruption countries. 
In a similar spirit, Hakkala et al (2005) divide foreign direct investments 
into horizontal and vertical investments. Horizontal investments are 
typically market seeking investment, and may be done in many markets 
at the same time. Vertical investments typically are done along the value 
chain of the firm in order to outsource and reduce production costs. They 
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find that only horizontal FDI is deterred by corruption, whereas vertical 
FDI is not. One explanation may be the significance of resources which 
necessitate investments in particular countries, corrupt or not.  
In conclusion, corruption may influence FDI negatively in highly corrupt 
countries for horizontal foreign direct investments. 
 
2. The Data 
We will study the implications of the above model in an international 
panel. We will use the stock of foreign direct investment from one country 
to another as our dependent variable. We will rely on OECD data and use 
FDI stocks from OECD countries invested in other OECD countries and 
virtual all the countries of the world in 2006. With data restrictions 
implied by other series described below, we arrive at a sample of 26 
investor countries and 125 countries where investments have taken 
place.  
We will use GDP and population data for the same year for all those 
countries from the same source. Statutory corporate income tax rates 
come from KPMG word taxation report. We use the CIA world factbook to 
identify latitude and longitude of each country and compute the distance 
between two countries with the Haversine formula, which takes account 
of the spherical shape of earth to compute the distance between two 
points starting from latitude and longitude coordinates in radian 
notation, 
 6371*-long)]*(longs(lat*)coscos(lat)co+sin(lat*) )latcos[sin(rcad = , 
where 6371 km is the earth radius. 
We use two indicators for legal uncertainty. First, we look at double tax 
agreements, which we have taken from the IBFD database, which has 
registered 2489 tax treaties between 186 countries. Second, we analyze 
legal traditions. We assume that countries with similar legal traditions 
find it easier to understand each other, and this should reduce legal 
uncertainty. We use the Juriglobe data from the University of Ottawa 
database (http://www.juriglobe.ca/) to identify the legal system of a 
country. This database contains five distinct legal traditions, common 
law, civil law, customary law, muslim law and jewish law, and allows for 
several legal traditions within one country, e.g. a former colony that had 
customary law, gets influenced by e.g. civil law through its colonial power 
and then turns towards muslim law. The degree of mutual 
understanding will be higher if both countries have only one identical 
legal system. We will use an interaction term between legal systems to 
identify common legal traditions. In order to ensure that we are not 
measuring corruption instead, we will also include the corruption index 
for transparency international. 
Legal uncertainty per se is not our main concern, however. We have 
found that legal uncertainty matters for investment decisions through its 
impact on expectations over taxation. For this reason, we will interact 
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our measures of legal uncertainty with the statutory corporate income 
tax. 
 
3. Evidence 
Apart from our dependent variable, the stock of foreign direct investment 
by country of origin and country of destination in 2006 according to 
OECD data, we have 4 panel data series, namely, the existence of a tax 
treaty between these countries, the distance between these two 
countries, and whether they share a common law or civil law tradition. 
Unfortunately for our estimation, none of the countries of origin had a 
muslim, jewish or customary law tradition. We also have eight data series 
that only vary with the country of destination. These variables are the 
corporate income tax rate, gross domestic product, population, and five 
dummy variables for the five legal systems. Finally, we have series that 
vary only with the country of source, namely the statutory corporate 
income tax and gross domestic product. All series except for dummies 
and ratios are transformed logarithmically. 
A natural starting point was to see whether corporate income taxes have 
an influence on foreign direct investment. This is shown in column A of 
table 1 below. We obtain the surprising result that an increase in 
corporate income taxes drives foreign direct investment. Obviously, this 
may be due to the fact that bigger economies attract more FDI but also 
have higher tax rates. We therefore control for GDP in the second 
estimation, presented in column B of table 1. The statutory corporate 
income tax rate now has a negative sign and GDP has a positive impact. 
A one percent increase in GDP will lead to a one percent increase in FDI, 
whereas a 1 percent decrease in the statutory corporate income tax leads 
to a 2.45% increase in FDI. We then also include GDP of source country, 
as bigger countries may manage to invest more, and indeed find a unit 
elasticity here, too. Column D then includes the ratio of corporate income 
tax rate between the destination and the source country. An increase in 
this ratio, either due to a reduction in the destination country statutory 
corporate income tax rate or due to an increase in the source country 
statutory corporate income tax rate reduces FDI.  
 
Table 1: Panel estimation. Dependent: bilateral FDI stock 2006 (in logs) 
 A B C D 
Constant 1.87 
(8.33) 
-21.59 
(-30.44) 
-49.58 
(-43.09) 
-48.38 
(-38.06) 
Corporate income tax rate 
(destination country) 
4.23 
(5.319) 
-2.45 
(-3.49) 
-2.44 
(-3.96) 
-1.07 
(-1.21) 
GDP (destination country)  1.01 
(34.35) 
1.01 
(38.92) 
1.01 
(38.94) 
GDP (source country)   1.04 0.99 
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(28.99) (24.21) 
CIT ratio 
(destination/source) 
   -0.38 
(-2.22) 
R2 0.9 29.2 44.8 44.9 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis.
 
Eliminating destination CIT as it is statistically insignificant, we find that 
a unit decrease in the CIT ratio increases FDI by ½ percent, as shown in 
column E of table 2. We then add population of the destination country. 
Given that we are using logs, we can interpret this by stating that both 
the absolute size of destination country, measured by its GDP, as well as 
the richness of the country, measured by GDP per capita, matters for 
foreign direct investment. We find that in addition to GDP itself, also GDP 
per capita would have a positive impact on FDI. However, the inclusion of 
GDP per capita breaks the unit elasticity of destination GDP and FDI, as 
confirmed by coefficient tests. This may be due to the fact that big poor 
countries attract less FDI, or rich small countries more. Next, we add 
geographical distance and find that countries attract less FDI when they 
are distant from countries of origin. 
 
Table 2: Panel estimation. Dependent: bilateral FDI stock 2006 (in logs) 
 E F G 
Constant -47.90 
(-39.63) 
-47.84 
(-39.99) 
-45.81 
(-37.63) 
GDP (destination country) 1.01 
(39.46) 
1.18 
(35.52) 
1.11 
(32.68) 
GDP (source country) 0.97 
(25.37) 
0.99 
(26.05) 
1.03 
(27.01) 
CIT ratio (destination/source) -0.52 
(-4.37) 
-0.38 
(-3.15) 
-0.29 
(-2.46) 
Population  -0.31 
(-8.00) 
-0.24 
(-6.25) 
Geographic distance   -0.30 
(-7.36) 
R2 44.9 46.1 47.0 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis.
 
We will now look at three different institutional variables that measure of 
legal uncertainty, corruption in the destination country, the difference in 
the legal system, and the existence of a tax treaty. Table H and I give the 
results, first with population included, and then without (as population 
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turns out insignificant). All variables have the expected sign. GDP in both 
the destination and source country increases bilateral FDI, whereas an 
increase in the statutory corporate income tax ratio reduces FDI. We find 
that low corruption is good for foreign direct investment, a different legal 
system is an impediment to FDI, but the existence of a tax treaty is 
favorable for FDI. In that respect, an institutional setting that reduces 
legal uncertainty appears to be good for FDI.  
 
Table 3: Panel estimation. Dependent: bilateral FDI stock 2006 (in logs) 
 H I J 
Constant -44.07 
(-35.46) 
-44.37 
(-36.12) 
-43.82 
(-35.23) 
GDP (destination country) 0.76 
(13.00) 
0.84 
(29.72) 
0.83 
(29.21) 
GDP (source country) 1.02 
(27.06) 
1.02 
(27.08) 
1.01 
(26.77) 
CIT ratio (destination/source) -0.24 
(-2.06) 
-0.22 
(-1.91) 
-0.34 
(-2.70) 
Population 0.10 
(1.56) 
  
Geographic distance -0.23 
(-5.73) 
-0.23 
(-5.59) 
-0.23 
(-5.61) 
(low) Corruption index 0.26 
(6.96) 
0.21 
(9.33) 
0.22 
(9.60) 
Treaty 0.60 
(6.21) 
0.71 
(6.32) 
0.59 
(6.19) 
Different legal system -0.45 
(-4.36) 
-0.43 
(-4.24) 
-1.31 
(-3.86) 
Interaction: Different legal 
system and CIT (destination 
country) 
  3.23 
(2.71) 
R2 48.9 48.9 49.0 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis.
 
In the theoretical part, we have argued that legal uncertainty may 
actually lead to excess entry into foreign markets, as tax speculators may 
hope for low or no taxation, and otherwise consider default. Clearly, the 
speculative gain is bigger if the destination country has a higher 
corporate income tax. We will try to identify this speculative motive with 
an interaction effect. In column J of table 3, we interact the different legal 
system with the statutory corporate income tax rate of the destination 
country. We find that the interaction term is positive and highly 
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significative. This is clear evidence that speculative entry exists. As an 
increase in the corporate income tax has an effect on both the corporate 
income tax ratio and the interaction effect, a straightforward 
interpretation of tax policy is not possible. However, when looking at the 
means of the variables, we find that the positive effect prevails for 
countries with different legal systems. In order to attract foreign FDI from 
countries with a different legal tradition, it may actually be preferable to 
have high and uncertain tax rates. 
Table 4: Panel estimation. Dependent: bilateral FDI stock 2006 (in logs) 
 K L M N 
Constant -43.70 
(-33.70) 
-43.52 
(-34.78) 
-43.40 
(-33.36) 
-43.10 
(-34.14) 
GDP (destination country) 0.83 
(28.72) 
0.82 
(28.92) 
0.82 
(28.48) 
0.82 
(28.57) 
GDP (source country) 1.01 
(26.45) 
1.01 
(26.60) 
1.01 
(26.30) 
1.00 
(26.37) 
CIT ratio (destina-
tion/source) 
-0.31 
(-2.41) 
-0.34 
(-2.89) 
-0.39 
(-2.91) 
-0.43 
(-3.48) 
Geographic distance -0.24 
(-5.76) 
-0.24 
(-5.89) 
-0.23 
(-5.70) 
-0.24 
(-5.91) 
(low) Corruption index 0.21 
(9.39) 
0.21 
(9.43) 
0.22 
(9.62) 
0.22 
(9.65) 
Treaty 0.16 
(0.53) 
 0.29 
(0.96) 
 
Interaction: Treaty and 
CIT (destination country) 
1.69 
(1.62) 
2.21 
(6.51) 
1.16 
(1.09) 
2.12 
(6.21) 
Different legal system -0.43 
(-4.22) 
-0.43 
(-4.22) 
-1.24 
(-3.57) 
-1.18 
(-3.45) 
Interaction: Different legal 
system and CIT 
(destination country) 
  2.95 
(2.43) 
2.75 
(2.30) 
R2 49.0 49.0 49.0 49.1 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis.
 
Table 4 repeats this exercise with an interaction variable between the 
corporate income tax rate and the existence of a tax treaty. We find that 
neither the treaty variable itself nor the interaction term are statistically 
significant and therefore drop the treaty variable in column L, implying 
that treaties themselves have no impact on FDI. The interaction effect 
then turns out positive and statistically significant. This implies that 
speculative entry occurs also when treaties add a layer of complexity to 
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the domestic and foreign legal system and thus increase legal 
uncertainty.  
Introducing treaties will have a positive effect on FDI if corporate income 
tax rates are higher. As opposed to different legal systems, an increase in 
the corporate income tax rate in the presence of a treaty will have a 
negative impact on FDI. 
In the last two columns of table 4, we present both interaction terms 
together, once again eliminating the statistically insignificant treaty 
dummy. The elasticities that we have measured before remain more or 
less the same. Both interaction terms indicate the impact of legal 
uncertainty on foreign direct investment through corporate income 
taxation. 
 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper has analyzed the effects of legal uncertainty in the application 
of double tax agreements on foreign direct investment in developing 
economies. The literature is surprisingly inconclusive and more often 
than not finds a negative or insignificant relationship. We explain this 
stylized fact by taking legal uncertainty into account.  
We have than tested these findings empirically in an international panel. 
We use the stock of foreign direct investment from one country to 
another as our dependent variable. The explanatory variables are the 
ratio of the statutory corporate income tax rates between the source and 
destination country, the existence of a tax treaty, and the common legal 
traditions, in addition to some control variables, in particular GDP in the 
source and destination country, corruption and geographic distance. 
We find that legal uncertainty matters in explaining foreign direct 
investment. An increase in the ratio of the statutory corporate income tax 
rate of the destination relative to the source country exhibits a 
traditionally negative and significant effect on foreign direct investment. 
Filtered through institutional variables, we find that the interaction 
variable between the statutory corporate income tax rate and the tax 
treaty dummy and the statutory corporate income tax rate interacted 
with a different legal systems dummy both exhibit a positive impact on 
foreign direct investment. Both results point to the direction of a positive 
but detrimental impact of legal uncertainty on foreign direct investment 
through tax rates. 
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